
Secretary Matching with General Arrivals
We provide online algorithms for secretary matching in general weighted ...
read it

Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values
We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous i...
read it

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among additive agents with...
read it

On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections
We study secretary problems in settings with multiple agents. In the sta...
read it

Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with NoUnderbidding
We study the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous 2nd price auctions (...
read it

Escaping Cannibalization? CorrelationRobust Pricing for a UnitDemand Buyer
A single seller wishes to sell n items to a single unitdemand buyer. We...
read it

The Efficiency of BestResponse Dynamics
Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed...
read it

Online Stochastic MaxWeight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models
We provide prophet inequality algorithms for online weighted matching in...
read it

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets
We study the power and limits of optimal dynamic pricing in combinatoria...
read it

A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
The endowment effect, coined by Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler, posits th...
read it

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such ...
read it

ComplementFree Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for TwoPlayer Combinatorial Auctions
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combina...
read it

Interdependent Values without SingleCrossing
We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to n poten...
read it

Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking
The prophet and secretary problems demonstrate online scenarios involvin...
read it

An EconomicBased Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching
We give a simple proof showing that the RANKING algorithm introduced by ...
read it

Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents
We give a prompt online mechanism for minimizing the sum of [weighted] c...
read it

MaxMin Greedy Matching
A bipartite graph G(U,V;E) that admits a perfect matching is given. One ...
read it

99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
A sequence of recent studies show that even in the simple setting of a s...
read it

On Voting and Facility Location
We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the so...
read it

Solving Cooperative Reliability Games
Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, fol...
read it
Michal Feldman
is this you? claim profile