
ProofofStake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
ProofofStake blockchains based on a longestchain consensus protocol a...
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Priorfree Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability
We study the problem of repeatedly auctioning off an item to one of k bi...
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Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules in the Probabilistic Setting
We consider the manipulability of tournament rules which map the results...
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Optimal MultiDimensional Mechanisms are not Local
Consider the problem of implementing a revenueoptimal, Bayesian Incenti...
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Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and NonTruthful Combinatorial Auctions
We provide the first separation in the approximation guarantee achievabl...
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On the (in)approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer
We consider a revenuemaximizing single seller with m items for sale to ...
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Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global DecisionMaking via Local Economic Transactions
This paper seeks to establish a framework for directing a society of sim...
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Auction learning as a twoplayer game
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenu...
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Credible, Truthful, and TwoRound (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenuema...
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Credible, Truthful, and BoundedRound Mechanisms via Cryptographic Commitments
We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenuema...
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A PermutationEquivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenu...
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Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision
All proper scoring rules incentivize an expert to predict accurately (re...
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Optimal Mechanism Design for SingleMinded Agents
We consider revenueoptimal mechanism design in the interdimensional set...
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When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase
We study a problem inspired by regulated health insurance markets, such ...
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Optimal SingleChoice Prophet Inequalities from Samples
We study the singlechoice Prophet Inequality problem when the gambler i...
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New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function MInimization
We consider submodular function minimization in the oracle model: given ...
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Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from PostedPrice Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NPhard
Stateoftheart postedprice mechanisms for submodular bidders with m i...
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Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality
Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design....
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Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees
We study information aggregation in networks where agents make binary de...
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Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and CoverConsistence
We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which n teams pla...
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Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries
We consider a revenuemaximizing seller with n items facing a single buy...
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Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities
We consider the problem of regulating products with negative externaliti...
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Optimal (and BenchmarkOptimal) Competition Complexity for Additive Buyers over Independent Items
The Competition Complexity of an auction setting refers to the number of...
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A DualityBased Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechan...
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Smoothed Analysis of MultiItem Auctions with Correlated Values
Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additi...
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ComplementFree Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for TwoPlayer Combinatorial Auctions
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combina...
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Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly
Although Bitcoin was intended to be a decentralized digital currency, in...
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Formal Barriers to LongestChain ProofofStake Protocols
The security of most existing cryptocurrencies is based on a concept cal...
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The Sample Complexity of Uptoε MultiDimensional Revenue Maximization
We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple b...
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Selling to a NoRegret Buyer
We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single i...
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Computing exact minimum cuts without knowing the graph
We give queryefficient algorithms for the global mincut and the st cu...
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The menu complexity of "oneandahalfdimensional" mechanism design
We study the menu complexity of optimal and approximatelyoptimal auctio...
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Multiarmed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms
We study a strategic version of the multiarmed bandit problem, where ea...
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S. Matthew Weinberg
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