
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks – in particular ma...
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Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency
We study contract design for welfare maximization in the well known "com...
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RegretMinimizing Bayesian Persuasion
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and re...
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Strategic Classification in the Dark
Strategic classification studies the interaction between a classificatio...
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Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints
Bayesian persuasion, as introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow in 2011, is ...
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Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values
We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous i...
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Escaping Cannibalization? CorrelationRobust Pricing for a UnitDemand Buyer
A single seller wishes to sell n items to a single unitdemand buyer. We...
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The Complexity of Contracts
We initiate the study of computing (near)optimal contracts in succinctl...
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Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budgets: Beyond Additive
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, b...
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Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and welldeveloped theory, a...
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ComplementFree Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for TwoPlayer Combinatorial Auctions
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combina...
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Simple versus Optimal Contracts
We consider the classic principalagent model of contract theory, in whi...
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Inbal TalgamCohen
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