Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion
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The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uniformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature assumes a dichotomy: either the sender is powerful enough to communicate separately with each receiver (a.k.a. private persuasion), or she cannot communicate separately at all (a.k.a. public persuasion). We propose a model that smoothly interpolates between the two, by introducing a natural multi-channel communication structure in which each receiver observes a subset of the sender's communication channels. This captures, e.g., receivers on a network, where information spillover is almost inevitable. We completely characterize when one communication structure is better for the sender than another, in the sense of yielding higher optimal expected utility universally over all prior distributions and utility functions. The characterization is based on a simple pairwise relation among receivers - one receiver information-dominates another if he observes at least the same channels. We prove that a communication structure M_1 is (weakly) better than M_2 if and only if every information-dominating pair of receivers in M_1 is also such in M_2. We also provide an additive FPTAS for the optimal sender's signaling scheme when the number of states is constant and the graph of information-dominating pairs is a directed forest. Finally, we prove that finding an optimal signaling scheme under multi-channel persuasion is computationally hard for a general family of sender's utility functions that admit computationally tractable optimal signaling schemes under both public and private persuasion.
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