PAD: Towards Principled Adversarial Malware Detection Against Evasion Attacks
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Machine Learning (ML) techniques facilitate automating malicious software (malware for short) detection, but suffer from evasion attacks. Many researchers counter such attacks in heuristic manners short of both theoretical guarantees and defense effectiveness. We hence propose a new adversarial training framework, termed Principled Adversarial Malware Detection (PAD), which encourages convergence guarantees for robust optimization methods. PAD lays on a learnable convex measurement that quantifies distribution-wise discrete perturbations and protects the malware detector from adversaries, by which for smooth detectors, adversarial training can be performed heuristically with theoretical treatments. To promote defense effectiveness, we propose a new mixture of attacks to instantiate PAD for enhancing the deep neural network-based measurement and malware detector. Experimental results on two Android malware datasets demonstrate: (i) the proposed method significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art defenses; (ii) it can harden the ML-based malware detection against 27 evasion attacks with detection accuracies greater than 83.45 absence of attacks; (iii) it matches or outperforms many anti-malware scanners in VirusTotal service against realistic adversarial malware.
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