Certifying LLM Safety against Adversarial Prompting
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Large language models (LLMs) released for public use incorporate guardrails to ensure their output is safe, often referred to as "model alignment." An aligned language model should decline a user's request to produce harmful content. However, such safety measures are vulnerable to adversarial prompts, which contain maliciously designed token sequences to circumvent the model's safety guards and cause it to produce harmful content. In this work, we introduce erase-and-check, the first framework to defend against adversarial prompts with verifiable safety guarantees. We erase tokens individually and inspect the resulting subsequences using a safety filter. Our procedure labels the input prompt as harmful if any subsequences or the input prompt are detected as harmful by the filter. This guarantees that any adversarial modification of a harmful prompt up to a certain size is also labeled harmful. We defend against three attack modes: i) adversarial suffix, which appends an adversarial sequence at the end of the prompt; ii) adversarial insertion, where the adversarial sequence is inserted anywhere in the middle of the prompt; and iii) adversarial infusion, where adversarial tokens are inserted at arbitrary positions in the prompt, not necessarily as a contiguous block. Empirical results demonstrate that our technique obtains strong certified safety guarantees on harmful prompts while maintaining good performance on safe prompts. For example, against adversarial suffixes of length 20, it certifiably detects 93 using the open source language model Llama 2 as the safety filter.
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