Authentication of cyber-physical systems under learning-based attacks
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The problem of attacking and authenticating cyber-physical systems is considered. This paper concentrates on the case of a scalar, discrete-time, time-invariant, linear plant under an attack which can override the sensor and the controller signals. Prior works assumed the system was known to all parties and developed watermark-based methods. In contrast, in this paper the attacker needs to learn the open-loop gain in order to carry out a successful attack. A class of two-phase attacks are considered: during an exploration phase, the attacker passively eavesdrops and learns the plant dynamics, followed by an exploitation phase, during which the attacker hijacks the input to the plant and replaces the input to the controller with a carefully crafted fictitious sensor reading with the aim of destabilizing the plant without being detected by the controller. For an authentication test that examines the variance over a time window, tools from information theory and statistics are utilized to derive bounds on the detection and deception probabilities with and without a watermark signal, when the attacker uses an arbitrary learning algorithm to estimate the open-loop gain of the plant.
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