Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Information

06/22/2021
by   Krzysztof R. Apt, et al.
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We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations for two classes of these games in which subgame perfect equilibria exist: two-player zero-sum games with, respectively, two and three outcomes.

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