Universal Lower-Bounds on Classification Error under Adversarial Attacks and Random Corruption
share
We theoretically analyse the limits of robustness to test-time adversarial and noisy examples in classification. Our work focuses on deriving bounds which uniformly apply to all classifiers (i.e all measurable functions from features to labels) for a given problem. Our contributions are three-fold. (1) In the classical framework of adversarial attacks, we use optimal transport theory to derive variational formulae for the Bayes-optimal error a classifier can make on a given classification problem, subject to adversarial attacks. The optimal adversarial attack is then an optimal transport plan for a certain binary cost-function induced by the specific attack model, and can be computed via a simple algorithm based on maximal matching on bipartite graphs. (2) We derive explicit lower-bounds on the Bayes-optimal error in the case of the popular distance-based attacks. These bounds are universal in the sense that they depend on the geometry of the class-conditional distributions of the data, but not on a particular classifier. Our results are in sharp contrast with the existing literature, wherein adversarial vulnerability of classifiers is derived as a consequence of nonzero ordinary test error. (3) For our third contribution, we study robustness to random noise corruption, wherein the attacker (or nature) is allowed to inject random noise into examples at test time. We establish nonlinear data-processing inequalities induced by such corruptions, and use them to obtain lower-bounds on the Bayes-optimal error for noisy problem.
READ FULL TEXT
