Uncoupled Learning Dynamics with O(log T) Swap Regret in Multiplayer Games

04/25/2022
by   Ioannis Anagnostides, et al.
0

In this paper we establish efficient and uncoupled learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in a general-sum multiplayer game, the swap regret of each player after T repetitions of the game is bounded by O(log T), improving over the prior best bounds of O(log^4 (T)). At the same time, we guarantee optimal O(√(T)) swap regret in the adversarial regime as well. To obtain these results, our primary contribution is to show that when all players follow our dynamics with a time-invariant learning rate, the second-order path lengths of the dynamics up to time T are bounded by O(log T), a fundamental property which could have further implications beyond near-optimally bounding the (swap) regret. Our proposed learning dynamics combine in a novel way optimistic regularized learning with the use of self-concordant barriers. Further, our analysis is remarkably simple, bypassing the cumbersome framework of higher-order smoothness recently developed by Daskalakis, Fishelson, and Golowich (NeurIPS'21).

READ FULL TEXT

page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4

research
03/22/2022

On Last-Iterate Convergence Beyond Zero-Sum Games

Most existing results about last-iterate convergence of learning dynamic...
research
06/17/2022

Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning for General Convex Games

A recent line of work has established uncoupled learning dynamics such t...
research
12/16/2019

Does the Multisecretary Problem Always Have Bounded Regret?

Arlotto and Gurvich (2019) showed that the regret in the multisecretary ...
research
07/29/2022

Best-of-Both-Worlds Algorithms for Partial Monitoring

This paper considers the partial monitoring problem with k-actions and d...
research
06/09/2021

Online Optimization in Games via Control Theory: Connecting Regret, Passivity and Poincaré Recurrence

We present a novel control-theoretic understanding of online optimizatio...
research
11/11/2021

Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning for Correlated Equilibria in Multi-Player General-Sum Games

Recently, Daskalakis, Fishelson, and Golowich (DFG) (NeurIPS`21) showed ...
research
06/13/2022

No-Regret Learning in Games with Noisy Feedback: Faster Rates and Adaptivity via Learning Rate Separation

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involv...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset