DeepAI AI Chat
Log In Sign Up

Two-Sided Matching Markets in the ELLIS 2020 PhD Program

by   Maximilian Mordig, et al.

The ELLIS PhD program is a European initiative that supports excellent young researchers by connecting them to leading researchers in AI. In particular, PhD students are supervised by two advisors from different countries: an advisor and a co-advisor. In this work we summarize the procedure that, in its final step, matches students to advisors in the ELLIS 2020 PhD program. The steps of the procedure are based on the extensive literature of two-sided matching markets and the college admissions problem [Knuth and De Bruijn, 1997, Gale and Shapley, 1962, Rothand Sotomayor, 1992]. We introduce PolyGS, an algorithm for the case of two-sided markets with quotas on both sides (also known as many-to-many markets) which we use throughout the selection procedure of pre-screening, interview matching and final matching with advisors. The algorithm returns a stable matching in the sense that no unmatched persons prefer to be matched together rather than with their current partners (given their indicated preferences). Roth [1984] gives evidence that only stable matchings are likely to be adhered to over time. Additionally, the matching is student-optimal. Preferences are constructed based on the rankings each side gives to the other side and the overlaps of research fields. We present and discuss the matchings that the algorithm produces in the ELLIS 2020 PhD program.


page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4


Multi-Sided Matching Markets with Consistent Preferences and Cooperative Partners

We introduce a variant of the three-sided stable matching problem for a ...

Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Information

School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one si...

Approximate Strategy-Proofness in Large, Two-Sided Matching Markets

An approximation of strategy-proofness in large, two-sided matching mark...

Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets

We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over ti...

Incentives in Two-sided Matching Markets with Prediction-enhanced Preference-formation

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absen...

A Continuum Model of Stable Matching With Finite Capacities

This paper introduces a unified framework for stable matching, which nes...

The Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching Problem: Approval-Based Matching with Applicant-Employer Relations

While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of...