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Optimal Pricing in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions
We study revenue optimization pricing algorithms for repeated posted-pri...
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Algorithmic Price Discrimination
We consider a generalization of the third degree price discrimination pr...
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Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms
We consider the simplest and most fundamental problem of selling a singl...
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Competitively Pricing Parking in a Tree
Motivated by demand-responsive parking pricing systems we consider poste...
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Online Revenue Maximization for Server Pricing
Efficient and truthful mechanisms to price resources on remote servers/m...
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Selling to Cournot oligopolists: pricing under uncertainty & generalized mean residual life
We study a classic Cournot market, which we extend to a two-stage game w...
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On Optimal Pricing of Services in On-demand Platforms
I consider the optimal hourly (or per-unit-time in general) pricing prob...
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Third-degree Price Discrimination Versus Uniform Pricing
We compare the revenue of the optimal third-degree price discrimination policy against a uniform pricing policy. A uniform pricing policy offers the same price to all segments of the market. Our main result establishes that for a broad class of third-degree price discrimination problems with concave revenue functions and common support, a uniform price is guaranteed to achieve one half of the optimal monopoly profits. This revenue bound obtains for any arbitrary number of segments and prices that the seller would use in case he would engage in third-degree price discrimination. We further establish that these conditions are tight, and that a weakening of common support or concavity leads to arbitrarily poor revenue comparisons.
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