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The Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets

by   Linda Cai, et al.
Princeton University

A recent breakthrough of Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno [AKL17] found that imbalance in the number of agents on each side of a random matching market has a profound effect on the expected behavior of the stable matches. Specifically, across all stable matchings, the "long side" (i.e. the side with a greater number of agents) receives significantly worse matches in expectation than the short side. We provide new intuition and a new proof for preliminary results in the spirit of [AKL17], showing that the "long side" is at a noticeable disadvantage in all stable matchings.


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