The Quality of Equilibria for Set Packing Games

09/29/2017
by   Jasper de Jong, et al.
0

We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which n selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games. Assuming that players are able to approximately play equilibrium strategies, we show that the total quality of the resulting equilibrium solutions is only moderately suboptimal. Our results are tight bounds on the price of anarchy for three equilibrium concepts, namely Nash equilibria, subgame perfect equilibria, and an equilibrium concept that we refer to as k-collusion Nash equilibrium.

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