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The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

07/20/2020

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by Mete Şeref Ahunbay, et al.

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We study the efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with two-buyers and complete information. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 1/T for auctions with T items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by 1-1/e≃ 0.632. This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.

Mete Şeref Ahunbay
4 publications
Adrian Vetta
15 publications

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