The Power of Telemetry: Uncovering Software-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Apple M1/M2 Systems
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Power analysis is a class of side-channel attacks, where power consumption data is used to infer sensitive information and extract secrets from a system. Traditionally, such attacks required physical access to the target, as well as specialized devices to measure the power consumption with enough precision. The PLATYPUS attack has shown that on-chip power meter capabilities exposed to a software interface might form a new class of power side-channel attacks. This paper presents a software-based power side-channel attack on Apple Silicon M1/M2 platforms, exploiting the System Management Controller (SMC) and its power-related keys, which provides access to the on-chip power meters through a software interface to user space software. We observed data-dependent power consumption reporting from such keys and analyzed the correlations between the power consumption and the processed data. Our work also demonstrated how an unprivileged user mode application successfully recovers bytes from an AES encryption key from a cryptographic service supported by a kernel mode driver in macOS. Furthermore, we discuss the impact of software-based power side-channels in the industry, possible countermeasures, and the overall implications of software interfaces for modern on-chip power management systems.
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