The Impact of Complex and Informed Adversarial Behavior in Graphical Coordination Games
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How does system-level information impact the ability of an adversary to degrade performance in a networked control system? How does the complexity of an adversary's strategy affect its ability to degrade performance? This paper focuses on these questions in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can influence a given fraction of the agents in the system. Focusing on the class of ring graphs, we explicitly highlight how both (i) the complexity of the attack strategies and (ii) the knowledge of the graph structure and agent identities can be leveraged by an adversary to degrade system performance. We study four types of adversarial influence with varying degrees of knowledge and complexity. We find these models can be ranked: complex and informed adversaries can inflict more harm to the system whereas simple and uninformed adversaries have the least ability to inflict damage.
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