The Convergence of Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy

09/12/2018
by   Bruno Escoffier, et al.
0

In this paper, we study liquid democracy, a collective decision making paradigm which lies between direct and representative democracy. One main feature of liquid democracy is that voters can delegate their votes in a transitive manner such that: A delegates to B and B delegates to C leads to A delegates to C. We study the stability (w.r.t. voters preferences) of the delegation process in liquid democracy and model it as a game in which the players are the voters and the strategies are possible delegations. This game-theoretic model enables us to answer several questions on the equilibria of this process under general preferences and several types of restricted preferences (e.g., single-peaked preferences).

READ FULL TEXT

page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4

04/10/2019

The Convergence of Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy in a Social Network

Liquid democracy is a collective decision making paradigm which lies bet...
09/19/2021

Wages and Utilities in a Closed Economy- A StrategicAnalysis

The broad objective of this paper is to initiate through a mathematical ...
09/24/2020

Non-convergence to stability in coalition formation games

We study the problem of convergence to stability in coalition formation ...
08/05/2022

Conflict-free joint sampling for preference satisfaction through quantum interference

Collective decision-making is vital for recent information and communica...
07/09/2021

A Comparison of Contextual and Non-Contextual Preference Ranking for Set Addition Problems

In this paper, we study the problem of evaluating the addition of elemen...
09/06/2015

Research: Analysis of Transport Model that Approximates Decision Taker's Preferences

Paper provides a method for solving the reverse Monge-Kantorovich transp...
06/23/2019

An AGI with Time-Inconsistent Preferences

This paper reveals a trap for artificial general intelligence (AGI) theo...