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The Better Half of Selling Separately

12/24/2017

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by Sergiu Hart, et al.

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Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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The University of Chicago

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Separate selling of two independent goods is shown to yield at least 62 the optimal revenue, and at least 73 regularity condition. This improves the 50 originally circulated in 2012).

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Sergiu Hart
8 publications
Philip J. Reny
1 publication

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The Better Half of Selling Separately

Related Research

A Note on Approximate Revenue Maximization with Two Items

Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods

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