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Tails Tor and other tools for Safeguarding Online Activities

by   Stephanie Abraham, et al.

There are not many known ways to break Tor anonymity, and they require an enormous amount of computational power. Controlling both entrance and exit nodes allows an attacker to compromise client IP with enough pattern analysis. If an .onion or public website does not use SSL, information will not be encrypted once it reaches the exit node. Tor has been successfully broken by Carnegie Mellon, however they will not answer questions nor confirm their method. This research paper investigates Tails Tor and other tools for Safeguarding Online Activities.


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