Tails Tor and other tools for Safeguarding Online Activities

10/24/2017
by   Stephanie Abraham, et al.
0

There are not many known ways to break Tor anonymity, and they require an enormous amount of computational power. Controlling both entrance and exit nodes allows an attacker to compromise client IP with enough pattern analysis. If an .onion or public website does not use SSL, information will not be encrypted once it reaches the exit node. Tor has been successfully broken by Carnegie Mellon, however they will not answer questions nor confirm their method. This research paper investigates Tails Tor and other tools for Safeguarding Online Activities.

READ FULL TEXT

page 3

page 6

page 9

research
12/10/2019

Client-side Vulnerabilities in Commercial VPNs

Internet users increasingly rely on commercial virtual private network (...
research
12/30/2022

An Analysis of Honeypots and their Impact as a Cyber Deception Tactic

This paper explores deploying a cyber honeypot system to learn how cyber...
research
02/15/2019

On the computational models for the analysis of illicit activities

This paper presents a study on the advancement of computational models f...
research
09/04/2022

InviCloak: An End-to-End Approach to Privacy and Performance in Web Content Distribution

In today's web ecosystem, a website that uses a Content Delivery Network...
research
08/12/2022

Mutual authentication in self-organized VANETs

The practical deployment of vehicular networks is still a pending issue....
research
01/07/2020

Plunge into the Underworld: A Survey on Emergence of Darknet

The availability of sophisticated technologies and methods of perpetrati...
research
01/24/2022

Online Assessment Misconduct Detection using Internet Protocol and Behavioural Classification

With the recent prevalence of remote education, academic assessments are...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset