Surprise in Elections

01/30/2018
by   Palash Dey, et al.
0

Elections involving a very large voter population often lead to outcomes that surprise many. This is particularly important for the elections in which results affect the economy of a sizable population. A better prediction of the true outcome helps reduce the surprise and keeps the voters prepared. This paper starts from the basic observation that individuals in the underlying population build estimates of the distribution of preferences of the whole population based on their local neighborhoods. The outcome of the election leads to a surprise if these local estimates contradict the outcome of the election for some fixed voting rule. To get a quantitative understanding, we propose a simple mathematical model of the setting where the individuals in the population and their connections (through geographical proximity, social networks etc.) are described by a random graph with connection probabilities that are biased based on the preferences of the individuals. Each individual also has some estimate of the bias in their connections. We show that the election outcome leads to a surprise if the discrepancy between the estimated bias and the true bias in the local connections exceeds a certain threshold, and confirm the phenomenon that surprising outcomes are associated only with closely contested elections. We compare standard voting rules based on their performance on surprise and show that they have different behavior for different parts of the population. It also hints at an impossibility that a single voting rule will be less surprising for all parts of a population. Finally, we experiment with the UK-EU referendum (a.k.a. Brexit) dataset that attest some of our theoretical predictions.

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