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Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location

by   Haris Aziz, et al.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportional fairness. We present several characterization results for mechanisms that satisfy strategyproofness and varying levels of proportional fairness. We also characterize one of the mechanisms as the unique equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies natural fairness and monotonicity properties. Finally, we identify strategyproof and proportionally fair mechanisms that provide the best welfare-optimal approximation among all mechanisms that satisfy the corresponding fairness axiom.


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