Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams

07/11/2022
by   Leora Schmerler, et al.
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In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However, there are many cases in which each member of M or W represents a team that consists of several individuals with common interests. For example, students may need to be matched to professors for their final projects, but each project is carried out by a team of students. Thus, the students first form teams, and the matching is between teams of students and professors. When a team is considered as an agent from M or W, it needs to have a preference order that represents it. A voting rule is a natural mechanism for aggregating the preferences of the team members into a single preference order. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams. Specifically, we assume that members of each team use the Borda rule for generating the preference order of the team. Then, the Gale-Shapley algorithm is used for finding a stable-matching, where the set M is the proposing side. We show that the single-voter manipulation problem can be solved in polynomial time, both when the team is from M and when it is from W. We show that the coalitional manipulation problem is computationally hard, but it can be solved approximately both when the team is from M and when it is from W.

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