Strategic Coalitions in Stochastic Games

10/10/2019
by   Pavel Naumov, et al.
0

The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and proposes two logical systems with modality "coalition has a strategy to transition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given goal." The logical properties of this modality depend on whether the modal language allows the empty coalition. The main technical results are a completeness theorem for a logical system with the empty coalition, a strong completeness theorem for the logical system without the empty coalition, and an incompleteness theorem which shows that there is no strongly complete logical system in the language with the empty coalition.

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