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Stable Noncrossing Matchings

03/06/2019
by   Suthee Ruangwises, et al.
Tokyo Institute of Technology
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Given a set of n men represented by n points lying on a line, and n women represented by n points lying on another parallel line, with each person having a list that ranks some people of opposite gender as his/her acceptable partners in strict order of preference. In this problem, we want to match people of opposite genders to satisfy people's preferences as well as making the edges not crossing one another geometrically. A noncrossing blocking pair of a matching M is a pair (m,w) of a man and a woman such that they are not matched with each other but prefer each other to their own partners in M, and the segment (m,w) does not cross any edge in M. A weakly stable noncrossing matching (WSNM) is a noncrossing matching that does not contain any noncrossing blocking pair. In this paper, we prove the existence of a WSNM in any instance by developing an O(n^2) algorithm to find one in a given instance.

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