SpectreRewind: A Framework for Leaking Secrets to Past Instructions
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Transient execution attacks,such as Spectre and Meltdown, utilize micro-architectural covert channels to leak secrets that should not have been accessible during logical program execution. Commonly used micro-architectural covert channels in such attacks are those that leave lasting footprints in the micro-architectural state, for example, a cache state change. This lasting footprint has led attackers to utilize an attack framework where secrets are transmitted into covert channel during transient execution and later, after transient execution is complete, read secret from covert channel. This has led to the proposal of high performance hardware defenses that track potential secret data during transient execution and either discard or revert micro-architectural changes once transient execution has completed. In this work, we create a new framework for transient execution attacks that we call SpectreRewind. Our framework allows the attacker to both transmit and receive secret before transient execution has completed, bypassing defenses that try to revert changes caused by the attack. Unlike similar techniques utilizing hyper-threading, SpectreRewind is designed to be performed on a single hardware thread making it viable on systems where attacker cannot utilize SMT. We accomplish this by reading from covert channel with instructions that come logically before the transient execution in program order. Using our framework, we are even able to utilize simultaneous covert channels from a single hardware thread and show this by creating a channel that utilizes contention on the floating point divisional unit of modern commodity processors.
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