SPECCFI: Mitigating Spectre Attacks using CFI Informed Speculation
share
Spectre attacks and their many subsequent variants are a new vulnerability class for modern CPUs. The attacks rely on the ability to misguide/hijack speculative execution, generally by exploiting the branch prediction structures, to execute a vulnerable code sequence speculatively. In this paper, we propose to use Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), a security technique used to stop control-flow hijacking attacks, on the committed path to prevent speculative control-flow from being hijacked to launch the most dangerous variants of the Spectre attacks (Spectre-BTB and Spectre-RSB). Specifically, CFI attempts to constrain the target of an indirect branch to a set of legal targets defined by a pre-calculated control-flow graph (CFG). As CFI is being adopted by commodity software (e.g., Windows and Android) and commodity hardware (e.g., Intel's CET and ARM's BTI), the CFI information could be readily available through the hardware CFI extensions. With the CFI information, we apply CFI principles to also constrain illegal control-flow during speculative execution. SpecCFI ensures that control flow instructions target legal destinations to constrain dangerous speculation on forward control-flow paths (indirect calls and branches). We complement our solution with a precise speculation-aware hardware stack to constrain speculation on backward control-flow edges (returns). We combine this solution with existing solutions against branch target predictor attacks (Spectre-PHT) to close all non-vendor-specific Spectre vulnerabilities. We show that SpecCFI results in small overheads both in terms of performance and additional hardware complexity.
READ FULL TEXT
