Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Security Game with Hypergame Framework

07/30/2021
by   Zhaoyang Cheng, et al.
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In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the help of hyper Nash equilibrium (HNE) to analyze both strategic stability and cognitive stability of equilibria in SLMF games with misinformation. To this end, we find mild stable conditions such that the equilibria with misperception and deception can derive HNE. Moreover, we analyze the robustness of the equilibria to reveal whether the players have the ability to keep their profits.

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