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Single Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization

by   Eric Steinberger, et al.

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the most successful algorithm for finding approximate Nash equilibria in imperfect information games. However, CFR's reliance on full game-tree traversals limits its scalability. For this reason, the game's state- and action-space is often abstracted (i.e. simplified) for CFR, and the resulting strategy is then translated back to the full game, which requires extensive expert-knowledge and often converges to highly exploitable policies. A recently proposed method, Deep CFR, applies deep learning directly to CFR, allowing the agent to intrinsically abstract and generalize over the state-space from samples, without requiring expert knowledge. In this paper, we introduce Single Deep CFR (SD-CFR), a simplified variant of Deep CFR that has a lower overall approximation error by avoiding the training of an average strategy network. We show that SD-CFR is more attractive from a theoretical perspective and empirically outperforms Deep CFR in head-to-head matches of a large poker game.


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