Log In Sign Up

Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions

by   Constantinos Daskalakis, et al.

We identify the first static credible mechanism for multi-item additive auctions that achieves a constant factor of the optimal revenue. This is one instance of a more general framework for designing two-part tariff auctions, adapting the duality framework of Cai et al [CDW16]. Given a (not necessarily incentive compatible) auction format A satisfying certain technical conditions, our framework augments the auction with a personalized entry fee for each bidder, which must be paid before the auction can be accessed. These entry fees depend only on the prior distribution of bidder types, and in particular are independent of realized bids. Our framework can be used with many common auction formats, such as simultaneous first-price, simultaneous second-price, and simultaneous all-pay auctions. If all-pay auctions are used, we prove that the resulting mechanism is credible in the sense that the auctioneer cannot benefit by deviating from the stated mechanism after observing agent bids. If second-price auctions are used, we obtain a truthful O(1)-approximate mechanism with fixed entry fees that are amenable to tuning via online learning techniques. Our results for first price and all-pay are the first revenue guarantees of non-truthful mechanisms in multi-dimensional environments; an open question in the literature [RST17].


page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4


A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design

We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechan...

An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)

This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, namely identify...

Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility

In practice, most mechanisms for selling, buying, matching, voting, and ...

An Optimal Distributionally Robust Auction

An indivisible object may be sold to one of n agents who know their valu...

Lookahead Auctions with Pooling

A Lookahead Auction (LA), introduced by Ronen, is an auction format for ...

A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design

Lately, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), i.e., uniquely discernible assets on...

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling

The Empirical Revenue Maximization (ERM) is one of the most important pr...