Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation

09/30/2013
by   Simone Righi, et al.
0

We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However, when triadic considerations are introduced, a window of opportunity for emergence of cooperation as a stable behaviour emerges.

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