Semantically Secure Private Set Intersection over Outsourced Multi-Owner Secret-Shared Databases
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Private set intersection (PSI) aims to allow users to find out the commonly shared items among the users without revealing other membership information. The most recently proposed approach to PSI in the database community was Prism, which is built upon secret sharing and the assumption that multiple non-colluding servers are available. One limitation of Prism lies in its semantic security: the encoding on the servers is deterministic, implying that the scheme cannot be indistinguishable under a chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA). This paper extends the original PSI scheme of Prism by two orthogonal primitives, namely Kaleido-RND and Kaleido-AES: the former exhibits highly efficient performance with randomized encoding and the latter is provably secure under CPA attacks with more computational overhead. A system prototype is implemented and deployed on a 34-node cluster of SQLite instances. Extensive experiments on the TPC-H benchmark and three real-world applications confirm the effectiveness of the proposed Kaleido primitives.
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