Security analysis of the W-OTS^+ signature scheme: Updating security bounds

02/18/2020
by   M. A. Kudinov, et al.
0

In this work, we discuss in detail a flaw in the original security proof of the W-OTS^+ variant of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme, which is an important component for various stateless and stateful many-time hash-based digital signature schemes. We update the security proof for the W-OTS^+ scheme and derive the corresponding security level. Our result is of importance for the security analysis of hash-based digital signature schemes.

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