Sample Complexity of Robust Learning against Evasion Attacks
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It is becoming increasingly important to understand the vulnerability of machine learning models to adversarial attacks. One of the fundamental problems in adversarial machine learning is to quantify how much training data is needed in the presence of evasion attacks, where data is corrupted at test time. In this thesis, we work with the exact-in-the-ball notion of robustness and study the feasibility of adversarially robust learning from the perspective of learning theory, considering sample complexity. We first explore the setting where the learner has access to random examples only, and show that distributional assumptions are essential. We then focus on learning problems with distributions on the input data that satisfy a Lipschitz condition and show that robustly learning monotone conjunctions has sample complexity at least exponential in the adversary's budget (the maximum number of bits it can perturb on each input). However, if the adversary is restricted to perturbing O(log n) bits, then one can robustly learn conjunctions and decision lists w.r.t. log-Lipschitz distributions. We then study learning models where the learner is given more power. We first consider local membership queries, where the learner can query the label of points near the training sample. We show that, under the uniform distribution, the exponential dependence on the adversary's budget to robustly learn conjunctions remains inevitable. We then introduce a local equivalence query oracle, which returns whether the hypothesis and target concept agree in a given region around a point in the training sample, and a counterexample if it exists. We show that if the query radius is equal to the adversary's budget, we can develop robust empirical risk minimization algorithms in the distribution-free setting. We give general query complexity upper and lower bounds, as well as for concrete concept classes.
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