Robust Voting Rules from Algorithmic Robust Statistics

12/13/2021
by   Allen Liu, et al.
0

In this work we study the problem of robustly learning a Mallows model. We give an algorithm that can accurately estimate the central ranking even when a constant fraction of its samples are arbitrarily corrupted. Moreover our robustness guarantees are dimension-independent in the sense that our overall accuracy does not depend on the number of alternatives being ranked. Our work can be thought of as a natural infusion of perspectives from algorithmic robust statistics into one of the central inference problems in voting and information-aggregation. Specifically, our voting rule is efficiently computable and its outcome cannot be changed by much by a large group of colluding voters.

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