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On Relevant Equilibria in Reachability Games
We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed grap...
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Approximate Fictitious Play for Mean Field Games
The theory of Mean Field Games (MFG) allows characterizing the Nash equi...
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Risk-Averse Equilibrium for Games
The term rational has become synonymous with maximizing expected payoff ...
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Cooperative Search Games: Symmetric Equilibria, Robustness, and Price of Anarchy
Assume that a treasure is placed in one of M boxes according to a known ...
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Team-maxmin equilibrium: efficiency bounds and algorithms
The Team-maxmin equilibrium prescribes the optimal strategies for a team...
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Reliable Intersection Control in Non-cooperative Environments
We propose a reliable intersection control mechanism for strategic auton...
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Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools
We introduce and study reward sharing schemes that promote the fair formation of stake pools in collaborative projects that involve a large number of stakeholders such as the maintenance of a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain. Our mechanisms are parameterised by a target value for the desired number of pools. We show that by properly incentivising participants, the desired number of stake pools is a non-myopic Nash equilibrium arising from rational play. Our equilibria also exhibit an efficiency / security tradeoff via a parameter that allows them to be calibrated and include only the pools with the smallest possible cost and/or provide protection against Sybil attacks, the setting where a single stakeholder creates a large number of pools in the hopes to dominate the collaborative project. We also experimentally demonstrate the reachability of such equilibria in dynamic environments where players react to each others strategic moves over an indefinite period of interactive play.
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