Remote Power Side-Channel Attacks on CNN Accelerators in FPGAs

11/15/2020 ∙ by Shayan Moini, et al. ∙ 0

To lower cost and increase the utilization of Cloud FPGAs, researchers have recently been exploring the concept of multi-tenant FPGAs, where multiple independent users simultaneously share the same FPGA. Despite its benefits, multitenancy opens up the possibility of malicious users co-locating on the same FPGA as a victim user, and extracting sensitive information. This issue becomes especially serious when the user is running a machine learning algorithm that is processing sensitive or private information. To demonstrate the dangers, this paper presents the first remote, power-based side-channel attack on a deep neural network accelerator running in a variety of Xilinx FPGAs and also on Cloud FPGAs using Amazon Web Services (AWS) F1 instances. This work in particular shows how to remotely obtain voltage estimates as a deep neural network inference circuit executes, and how the information can be used to recover the inputs to the neural network. The attack is demonstrated with a binarized convolutional neural network used to recognize handwriting images from the MNIST handwritten digit database. With the use of precise time-to-digital converters for remote voltage estimation, the MNIST inputs can be successfully recovered with a maximum normalized cross-correlation of 84 between the input image and the recovered image on local FPGA boards and 77 AWS F1 instances. The attack requires no physical access nor modifications to the FPGA hardware.



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