Relationship Design for Socially Desirable Behavior in Static Games
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Interactions among multiple self-interested agents may not necessarily yield socially desirable behaviors. While static games offer a pragmatic model for such interactions, and modifying the utilities of the agents in such games provides a means toward achieving socially desirable behavior, manipulating the utilities is hard-if not impossible-after the system is deployed. We investigate an alternative means where each agent incorporates others' utilities into its own utility based on a relationship network, which characterizes how much one agent cares about another and hence the extent of their utility incorporation. We introduce the notion of a relationship game, a static game with a set of weighted relationship networks and a social cost function. The main problem we study is the design of the weight vector on the relationships such that the Nash equilibrium of the associated game is socially desirable. We propose an ordering-based exact method and a gradient-based approximate method to solve this problem. We show theoretically that the exact solution scales exponentially with the number of players. Empirical results show both methods are effective and scale exponentially, with the runtime of gradient-based solution growing slower.
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