Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time

05/29/2018

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We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.

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Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time

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