Random evolutionary games and random polynomials

04/26/2023

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by   Manh Hong Duong, et al.

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In this paper, we discover that the class of random polynomials arising from the equilibrium analysis of random asymmetric evolutionary games is exactly the Kostlan-Shub-Smale system of random polynomials, revealing an intriguing connection between evolutionary game theory and the theory of random polynomials. Through this connection, we analytically characterize the statistics of the number of internal equilibria of random asymmetric evolutionary games, namely its mean value, probability distribution, central limit theorem and universality phenomena. Moreover, comparing symmetric and asymmetric random games, we establish that symmetry in the group interaction increases the expected number of internal equilibria. Our research establishes new theoretical understanding of asymmetric evolutionary games and why symmetry/asymmetry of group interactions matters.