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Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences

11/03/2019
by   Haris Aziz, et al.
0

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on which projects to fund. We consider PB in which voters may be asymmetric, and they report ordinal preferences over projects. We propose proportional representation axioms for the setting and clarify how they fit into other preference aggregation settings. As a result of our study, we also discover a new solution concept that is stronger than proportional justified representation (PJR) for approval-based multi-winner voting.

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