Proportionality in Committee Selection with Negative Feelings

01/05/2021
by   Nimrod Talmon, et al.
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We study a class of elections in which the input format is trichotomous and allows voters to elicit their negative feelings explicitly. In particular, we study multiwinner elections with a special proclivity to elect proportionally representative committees. That is, we design various axioms to deal with negative feelings and suggest some structures to these preferences that allow better preference aggregation rules. We propose two different classes of axioms designed to aggregate trichotomous preferences more efficiently. We propose trichotomous versions of some well known multiwinner voting rules and report their satisfiability of our axioms. Hence, with reports of our simulations as evidence, we build upon the social optimality of our proportionality based axioms to evaluate the quality of voting rules for electing a proportionally representative committee with trichotomous ballots as inputs.

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