
Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism
We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragmén ...
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Achieving Proportional Representation via Voting
Proportional representation (PR) is often discussed in voting settings a...
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Representing the Insincere: Strategically Robust Proportional Representation
Proportional representation (PR) is a fundamental principle of many demo...
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The Core of Approval Participatory Budgeting with Uniform Costs (or with up to Four Projects) is NonEmpty
In the Approval Participatory Budgeting problem an agent prefers a set o...
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The Schulze Method of Voting
We propose a new singlewinner election method ("Schulze method") and pr...
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Proportional Representation in Vote Streams
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streamin...
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Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Substitute Projects
Participatory budgeting is a democratic process for allocating funds to ...
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Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Cardinal Utilities
We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to have arbitrary additive valuations over the projects. We formulate two axioms that guarantee proportional representation to groups of voters with common interests. To the best of our knowledge, all known rules for participatory budgeting do not satisfy either of the two axioms; in addition we show that the most prominent proportional rules for committee elections (such as Proportional Approval Voting) cannot be adapted to arbitrary costs nor to additive valuations so that they would satisfy our axioms of proportionality. We construct a simple and attractive voting rule that satisfies one of our axioms (for arbitrary costs and arbitrary additive valuations), and that can be evaluated in polynomial time. We prove that our other stronger axiom is also satisfiable, though by a computationally more expensive and less natural voting rule.
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