Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design

08/15/2019
by   Ian Ball, et al.
0

We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in a mechanism design setting. The principal verifies the agent's claims with statistical tests. The agent's probability of passing each test depends on his type. In our framework, the revelation principle holds. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all the other types. In that case, the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. In a quasilinear environment, we solve for the revenue-maximizing mechanism by introducing a new expression for the virtual value that encodes the effect of testing.

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