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Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms

by   Diodato Ferraioli, et al.

Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in [Ferraioli&Ventre, AAAI 2017], is to find a small (possibly, the smallest) set of conditions allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fines for lies or verifying a linear number of agents.


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