DeepAI AI Chat
Log In Sign Up

Price of Anarchy in Stochastic Atomic Congestion Games with Affine Costs

by   Roberto Cominetti, et al.
Luiss Guido Carli
Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez
RWTH Aachen University

We consider an atomic congestion game with stochastic demand in which each player participates in the game with probability p, and incurs no cost with probability 1-p. We assume that p is common knowledge among all players and that players are independent. For congestion games with affine costs, we provide an analytic expression for the price of anarchy as a function of p, which is monotonically increasing and converges to the well-known bound of 5/2 as p→ 1. On the other extreme, for p≤1/4 the bound is constant and equal to 4/3 independently of the game structure and the number of players. We show that these bounds are tight and are attained on routing games with purely linear costs. Additionally, we also obtain tight bounds for the price of stability for all values of p.


page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4


Convergence of Large Atomic Congestion Games

We study the convergence of sequences of atomic unsplittable congestion ...

The Price of Anarchy in Routing Games as a Function of the Demand

Most of the literature concerning the price of anarchy has focused on th...

Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy and Stability in Sequential Transportation Games

In this paper, we analyze a transportation game first introduced by Fota...

Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry

Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent stra...

Exact Price of Anarchy for Weighted Congestion Games with Two Players

This paper gives a complete analysis of worst-case equilibria for variou...

The Curse of Ties in Congestion Games with Limited Lookahead

We introduce a novel framework to model limited lookahead in congestion ...

Toll Caps in Privatized Road Networks

We study a nonatomic routing game on a parallel link network in which li...