Practical Verifiable In-network Filtering for DDoS defense
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In light of ever-increasing scale and sophistication of modern DDoS attacks, we argue that it is time to revisit in-network filtering or the idea of empowering DDoS victims to install in-network traffic filters in the upstream transit networks. Recent proposals have suggested that filtering DDoS traffic at a small number of large transit networks on behalf of remote DDoS victims can handle large volumetric attacks effectively. However, even if a transit network wishes to offer filtering services to remote DDoS victims, there still remains a practical issue of the lack of verifiable filtering - no one can check if the filtering service executes the filter rules correctly as requested by the DDoS victims. Without filtering verifiability, neighbor autonomous systems (ASes) and DDoS victims cannot detect when filtering is executed poorly or unfairly discriminates neighbor ASes. In this paper, we show the technical feasibility of verifiable in-network filtering, called VIF, that offers filtering verifiability to DDoS victims and neighbor ASes. We utilize Intel SGX as a feasible root of trust. As a practical deployment model, we suggest that Internet exchange points (IXPs) are the ideal candidates for the early adopters of our verifiable filters due to their central locations and flexible software-defined architecture. Our proof of concept demonstrates that a single VIF filter can handle nearly 10Gb/s traffic and execute up to 3000 filter rules. We show that VIF can easily scale to handle larger traffic volume (e.g., 500 Gb/s) and more complex filtering operations (e.g., 150,000 rules) by parallelizing SGX-based filters. Furthermore, our large-scale simulations of two realistic attacks (i.e., DNS amplification, Mirai-based flooding) show that only a small number (e.g., 5-25) of large IXPs are needed to offer VIF filtering service to handle the majority (e.g., up to 80-90
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