Practical Traffic-space Adversarial Attacks on Learning-based NIDSs
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Machine learning (ML) techniques have been increasingly used in anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to detect unknown attacks. However, ML has shown to be extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks, aggravating the potential risk of evasion attacks against learning-based NIDSs. In this situation, prior studies on evading traditional anomaly-based or signature-based NIDSs are no longer valid. Existing attacks on learning-based NIDSs mostly focused on feature-space and/or white-box attacks, leaving the study on practical gray/black-box attacks largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we conduct the first systematic study of the practical traffic-space evasion attack on learning-based NIDSs. We outperform the previous work in the following aspects: (1) practical—instead of directly modifying features, we provide a novel framework to automatically mutate malicious traffic with extremely limited knowledge while preserving its functionality; (2) generic—the proposed attack is effective for any ML classifiers (i.e., model-agnostic) and most non-payload-based features; (3) explainable—we propose a feature-based interpretation method to measure the robustness of targeted systems against such attacks. We extensively evaluate our attack and defense scheme on Kitsune, a state-of-the-art learning-based NIDS, as well as measuring the robustness of various NIDSs using diverse features and ML classifiers. Experimental results show promising results and intriguing findings.
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