
Persuading Voters in Districtbased Elections
We focus on the scenario in which an agent can exploit his information a...
read it

Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting
We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the ...
read it

MultiParty Campaigning
We study a social choice setting of manipulation in elections and extend...
read it

Representing the Insincere: Strategically Robust Proportional Representation
Proportional representation (PR) is a fundamental principle of many demo...
read it

Optimizing Voting Order on Sequential Juries: A Median Voter Theorem
We consider an oddsized "jury", which votes sequentially between two st...
read it

Incentivising Participation in Liquid Democracy with Breadth First Delegation
Liquid democracy allows an agent to either vote directly over the availa...
read it

An Attack on the the Encryption Scheme of the Moscow Internet Voting System
The next Moscow City Duma elections will be held on September 8th with a...
read it
Persuading Voters: It's Easy to Whisper, It's Hard to Speak Loud
We focus on the following natural question: is it possible to influence the outcome of a voting process through the strategic provision of information to voters who update their beliefs rationally? We investigate whether it is computationally tractable to design a signaling scheme maximizing the probability with which the sender's preferred candidate is elected. We focus on the model recently introduced by Arieli and Babichenko (2019) (i.e., without interagent externalities), and consider, as explanatory examples, kvoting rule and plurality voting. There is a sharp contrast between the case in which private signals are allowed and the more restrictive setting in which only public signals are allowed. In the former, we show that an optimal signaling scheme can be computed efficiently both under a kvoting rule and plurality voting. In establishing these results, we provide two general (i.e., applicable to settings beyond voting) contributions. Specifically, we extend a well known result by Dughmi and Xu (2017) to more general settings, and prove that, when the sender's utility function is anonymous, computing an optimal signaling scheme is fixed parameter tractable w.r.t. the number of receivers' actions. In the public signaling case, we show that the sender's optimal expected return cannot be approximated to within any factor under a kvoting rule. This negative result easily extends to plurality voting and problems where utility functions are anonymous.
READ FULL TEXT
Comments
There are no comments yet.