Partial Truthfulness in Minimal Peer Prediction Mechanisms with Limited Knowledge

11/17/2017

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by   Goran Radanovic, et al.

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We study minimal single-task peer prediction mechanisms that have limited knowledge about agents' beliefs. Without knowing what agents' beliefs are or eliciting additional information, it is not possible to design a truthful mechanism in a Bayesian-Nash sense. We go beyond truthfulness and explore equilibrium strategy profiles that are only partially truthful. Using the results from the multi-armed bandit literature, we give a characterization of how inefficient these equilibria are comparing to truthful reporting. We measure the inefficiency of such strategies by counting the number of dishonest reports that any minimal knowledge-bounded mechanism must have. We show that the order of this number is Θ( n), where n is the number of agents, and we provide a peer prediction mechanism that achieves this bound in expectation.